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Responsibility	to	be	Enthusiastic?		Public	Servants	and	the	Public	Face	of	‘Promiscuous	
Partisanship’	
	
	
“These	were	backroom	people	who	relished	being	out	of	the	limelight.	There	was	a	
deal	done	that	for	concealed	influence	and	some	would	say	power,	there	was	
anonymity	while	they	were	doing	it,	apart	from	the	appearance	in	the	odd	honours	
list,	when	they	would	shimmer	discretely	to	the	Palace	for	a	gong	or	an	upgrade	
gong	and	back	again.	But	as	a	friend	of	mine	used	to	say,	rather	unkindly	of	some	
individuals,	they	were	scarcely	household	names	in	their	own	household.”	
Peter	Hennessy	–	The	Secret	World	of	Whitehall,	2011,	BBC	Documentary.	
	
The	modern	mandarin	is	no	longer	a	creature	of	the	shadows.		The	mid	twentieth	century	
civil	service	leaders	described	by	Peter	Hennessy	above	thrived	in	conditions	in	which	quiet	
anonymity	was	simply	a	given.		Their	contemporary	counterparts	have	found	themselves	–	
sometimes	reluctantly	and	sometimes	not	–	drawn	much	further	into	the	public	gaze.		As	
Rhodes	has	recently	asserted:	“...nowadays,	senior	civil	servants	speak	in	public	almost	as	
often	as	ministers”	(2011,	9).	Through	mediums	as	diverse	as	social	media,	public	speeches,	
media	statements,	parliamentary	committee	appearances,	and	public	inquiries,	senior	
public	servants	are	emerging	from	anonymity	to	take	their	place	alongside	elected	
politicians	as	part	of	the	‘public	face’	of	government.	
	 The	reasons	for	this	greater	public	exposure	reflect	a	range	of	interconnected	shifts	
in	the	pace	and	complexity	of	modern	governance.		A	renewed	focus	on	policy	
implementation	and	service	delivery	has	occurred	at	a	time	when	network	governance	has	
increased	the	complexity	of	negotiating	successful	policy	outcomes.		These	difficulties	now	
have	to	be	negotiated	more	in	the	public	eye	than	ever	before,	with	more	transparent	
decision-making	being	coupled	with	a	more	voracious	media	needing	to	feed	a	24/7	news	
cycle.		New	Public	Management	has	led	to	an	outcomes-based	performance	culture,	in	
which	ministers,	the	parliament,	and	the	press	all	expect	a	greater	level	of	direct	public	
accountability	by	public	servants.	
The	shift	to	a	higher	public	profile	has,	in	turn,	fed	into	an	ongoing	debate	about	how	
far	public	servants	should	be	expected	to	go	in	publicly	supporting	the	policies	of	the	
governments	that	they	serve	(see	Mulgan	2007	and	2008;	Wanna	2008).		The	late	Peter	
Aucoin	has	argued	that,	taken	collectively,	changes	to	public	administration	in	recent	
decades	have	seen	the	emergence	of	‘New	Political	Governance’	(NPG).	Amongst	the	
characteristics	of	NPG	in	Aucoin’s	account	is	an	assumption	that	public	servants	will	act	as	
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‘promiscuous	partisans’	in	supporting	the	political	agenda	of	the	government	of	the	day	
(Aucoin	2012,	179).			
“Promiscuous	partisanship”,	Aucoin	argued,	is	made	more	dangerous	by	the	degree	
to	which	public	service	leaders	have	become	public	figures	who	are	asked	to	represent	the	
government	in	an	ever	widening	range	of	forums	and	roles.	
But	governments	can	also	want	their	public	service	to	be	publicly	supportive,	even	
enthusiastic,	about	their	agenda	and	to	promote	it	in	their	consultations	with	
stakeholders	as	well	as	in	their	delivery	of	services	directly	to	the	public.		To	the	
degree	that	governments	have	this	expectation	of	enthusiastic	support,	it	goes	
beyond	the	traditional	requirement	of	loyalty	to	the	government	of	the	day.	It	
substitutes	partisan	loyalty	for	impartial	loyalty.		The	risk	of	politicization	is	
enhanced	by	the	fact	that	public	servants,	at	various	levels,	are	now	much	more	
exposed	publicly	in	their	dealings	with	stakeholders,	organized	interests,	individual	
citizens,	the	media,	and	parliamentarians.	The	anonymity	of	public	servants,	as	
invisible	to	parliament	or	the	public,	disappeared	some	time	ago.	In	the	environment	
of	NPG,	moreover,	ministers,	sometimes	explicitly,	usually	implicitly,	expect	those	
public	servants	who	are	seen	and	heard	in	countless	public	forums	to	support	
government	policy,	that	is,	to	go	beyond	mere	description	and	explanation.	(Aucoin	
2012,	189)	
	
Aucoin	goes	on	to	provide	some	useful	examples	of	promiscuous	partisanship	in	
Australia,	Canada	and	the	United	Kingdom.		What	is	missing	is	a	clear	line	between	what	
might	be	considered	appropriate	‘responsiveness’	to	ministers	and	what	should	be	
considered	inappropriate	‘partisan’	behavior.		Is	promiscuous	partisanship	an	inherently	
‘bad’	activity,	or	does	it	only	become	a	problem	if	it	renders	a	public	servant	unable	to	offer	
the	same	level	of	support	to	an	incoming	government	of	a	different	political	stripe?	
Aucoin’s	examples	include	a	civil	servant	editing	a	book	supportive	of	government	
policy	in	the	United	Kingdom,	and	the	appearance	of	a	public	servant	in	a	government	
advertisement	in	Australia.	I	argue	that	what	makes	these	two	cases	problematic	is	not	the	
activity	itself,	but	its	public	nature.		The	more	that	public	servants	are	placed	in	the	public	
eye,	the	more	their	activities	can	give	rise	to	perceptions	of	partisanship	(Lindquist	and	
Rasmussen,	2012,	191).		Public	servants	have	loyally	drafted	and	supported	government	
policy	for	decades	–	it’s	part	of	their	core	role.		It’s	only	when	individual	public	servants	
adopt	a	public	face	of	their	own	–	separate	from	that	of	their	minister	–	that	concerns	arise.		
In	other	words,	what	has	changed	is	not	partisan	behaviour	(which	is	always	a	matter	of	
perception)	but	the	decline	in	anonymity	that	has	elevated	senior	public	servants	to	the	
public	stage	in	their	own	right.			
Aucoin’s	third	example	relates	to	the	uncritical	carrying	out	of	ministerial	
instructions	by	Canadian	public	servants	in	the	Sponsorship	Scandal.	But	did	the	failings	in	
this	case	belong	more	to	the	bureaucracy	or	to	ministers	themselves?		Public	servants	are	
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meant	to	implement	government	policy.		It’s	their	job.		In	the	case	of	the	Sponsorship	
Scandal,	it	could	certainly	be	argued	that	a	degree	of	frank	and	fearless	behaviour	and	good	
judgement	may	have	been	missing,	but	that	is	a	different	question	to	allegations	of	
‘partisanship’.		It	is	hard	to	disagree	with	Lindquist	and	Rasmussen’s	recent	conclusion	that	
“what	was	notable	was	how	few	professional	public	servants	were	implicated”	(2012,	195).		
As	Prime	Minister	Harper	told	public	servants	when	introducing	the	new	2006	Federal	
Accountability	Act	in	response	to	the	Sponsorship	Scandal:	“‘[y]ou	didn’t	cross	the	line.		Your	
political	masters	did”	(Harper	2006,	para	18).		
The	‘responsiveness’	debate	is	centred	on	this	point	–	on	how	far	public	servants	
have	a	duty	to	‘stand	up’	to	the	government	of	the	day	when	they	perceive	that	ministers	
are	‘crossing	the	line’.		Even	the	most	strident	critics	of	overly	responsive	public	servants	
concede	that	decision-making	rightly	remains	the	preserve	of	ministers.		Once	public	
servants	have	given	their	frank	and	fearless	advice,	they	have	no	right	to	sulk	in	a	corner	if	
their	advice	is	not	taken.		Instead	they	must	get	on	and	implement	government	policy.		
What	is	to	be	avoided	is	perhaps	not	so	much	‘partisan’	behaviour	as	a	lack	of	judgement	
and	prudence	in	assessing	the	appropriateness	of	government	directives	to	public	servants.		
In	the	case	of	the	Sponsorship	Scandal,	the	failure	to	provide	frank	and	fearless	advice	has	
no	logical	link	to	being	partisan	as	opposed	to	being	overly	responsive.			
Once	public	servants	shed	their	anonymity	and	are	seen	to	publicly	support	or	
defend	government	policy,	the	distinction	between	appropriate	responsiveness	and	
inappropriate	partisanship	takes	on	a	sharper	edge.		It	is	no	secret	that	governments	spend	
a	significant	amount	of	their	time	trying	to	shape	public	perceptions	–	cynics	would	say	
“spin”	–	about	their	policy	agenda.		It	is	an	aspect	of	contemporary	governance	that	self	
evidently	has	an	impact	on	the	work	of	public	servants	when	they	are	asked	to	publicly	
support	and	implement	that	agenda.		Aucoin’s	account	raises	important	questions	about	
how	contemporary	Westminster	public	services	are	reacting	to	changing	demands	and	
expectations	on	what	their	role	should	be.		Are	institutional	structures	and	guidelines	
encouraging	public	servants	in	Westminster	system	countries	to	become	public	advocates	
for	government	policy?		If	so,	is	this	an	abrogation	of	fundamental	tenets	of	the	
Westminster	system,	or	merely	a	form	of	institutional	stretching	that	re-shapes	but	does	
not	break	traditional	bonds	of	impartiality?	
This	article	seeks	answers	to	these	questions	through	a	comparative	analysis	of	
public	service	codes	and	guidelines	across	four	established	Westminster	democracies:	
Australia,	Canada,	New	Zealand	and	the	United	Kingdom.		It	argues	that	across	all	four	
jurisdictions	there	is	evidence	of	governments	seeking	a	greater	level	of	proactivity	from	
public	servants	in	their	public	explanations	of	government	policy	–	but	that	this	stops	short	
in	most	cases	of	formally	institutionalizing	a	new	“promiscuous	partisanship”.		In	the	United	
Kingdom	case,	the	evidence	in	support	of	the	promiscuous	partisanship	thesis	is	at	its	
strongest	and	it	is	argued	here	that	the	formal	guidelines	leave	little	room	for	civil	servants	
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to	resist	pressure	to	actively	justify	government	policy.		In	all	cases,	a	tension	remains	
between	institutionalised	understandings	of	how	Westminster	systems	should	work,	and	
the	individual	interpretations	of	public	servants	on	where	the	line	between	partisanship	and	
impartiality	lies.								
My	focus	here	is	primarily	on	the	upper	echelons	of	the	public	service	in	each	
jurisdiction.		The	mandarins	were	the	main	focus	of	Aucoin’s	NPG	concerns	because	of	their	
ability	to	either	promote	or	resist	a	more	politicized	culture	within	their	organisations.		It	is	
at	this	level	that	concerns	about	too	much	responsiveness	have	led	to	debates	on	how	far	
diminished	job	security	amongst	public	service	leaders	has	led	to	less	frank	and	fearless	
advice	and	whether	this	has	undermined	the	‘neutral	competence’	public	service	model	
(Boston	and	Halligan	2012;	Podger	2007a	and	2007b;	Shergold	2007).		But	lower-ranking	
public	servants	are	not	immune.		The	same	issues	are	faced	by	any	public	servant	who	has	a	
public	aspect	to	their	role.		This	includes	press	officers	for	example,	whose	difficulties	are	
discussed	below	in	the	United	Kingdom	case.	
	
Emerging	from	Anonymity	
Rhodes,	Wanna	and	Weller	(2009)	locate	the	institutional	behavior	of	public	bureaucracies	
within	a	collection	of	traditions	and	beliefs	that	form	mutual	understandings	of	what	
Westminster	is.		Utilising	an	interpretivist	approach	they	examine	what	Westminster	means	
to	the	public	service	leaders	who	work	within	it.		They	distinguish	between	the	“political	
traditions”	of	responsible	government	–	encompassing	the	established	decision-making	and	
accountability	conventions	–	and	“administrative	traditions”	(2009,	157-158).		The	latter	
encompass	the	“…evolving	notions	of	professionalism,	degrees	of	independence,	expertise	
and	technical	proficiency,	management,	and	preferred	patterns	of	recruitment	and	
workforce	composition”	(2009,	158).		The	traditional	commitment	to	the	anonymity	of	the	
public	service	–	and	its	relationship	to	conventions	of	non-partisanship	–	exists	within	this	
dual	realm	of	political	and	administrative	tradition.		These	traditions	are	then	either	
buttressed	or	challenged	by	the	impacts	of	formal	laws	such	as	freedom	of	information	
requirements	and	‘soft’	laws	like	codes	of	conduct	and	codes	of	ethics.		It	is	these	latter	
codes	that	I	will	argue	provide	an	important	guide	for	public	servants	as	they	assess	how	
institutionalised	traditions	should	apply	to	their	own	behavior.	
Anonymity,	like	so	much	in	the	Westminster	tradition,	is	an	idea	that	emerged	
through	practice	and	convention	over	time.	The	Northcote-Trevelyan	Report	of	1854	–	
rightly	celebrated	as	the	foundation	stone	of	modern	Westminster-style	civil	services	–	was	
silent	on	both	anonymity	and	impartiality	(Rhodes	et	al	2008,	468).	And	yet,	both	concepts	
have	now	found	an	established	place	in	understandings	of	Westminster	convention.	In	their	
groundbreaking	study	of	1970’s	bureaucracy,	Aberbach,	Putnam	and	Rockman	described	
the	politically	insulated	nature	of	the	Civil	Service	in	Britain	and	the	Netherlands:	
	 5	
These	are	precisely	the	systems	in	which	administrators	are	institutionally	most	
insulated	from	the	world	of	overt	politics,	where	civil	servants	generally	operate	
under	the	veil	of	anonymity,	and	where	ministerial	responsibility,	collective	cabinet	
government,	and	a	party-centered	parliament	are	most	fully	developed.	(1981,	233)	
At	one	level,	the	contemporary	challenges	to	this	traditional	anonymity	have	little	to	
do	with	the	personal	wishes	of	senior	bureaucrats	and	everything	to	do	with	the	increased	
willingness	of	politicians	and	the	public	to	hold	them	more	directly	accountable	for	
management	mistakes.	For	example,	rather	than	ministers	taking	responsibility	for	
whatever	mistakes	are	made	by	their	department	–	as	Westminster	convention	in	theory	
demands	–	they	are	now	sometimes	using	civil	servants	as	their	shield	against	public	
disapproval.		To	quote	from	a	study	by	Van	Dorpe	and	Horton	(2011,	246-247):	
The	decreased	anonymity	is	not	only	due	to	the	increased	exposure	by	ministers,	but	
also	a	consequence	of	the	ever	more	intrusive	media.	A	complaint	was	filed	by	the	
First	Division	Association	–	the	union	representing	senior	civil	servants	–	in	2006	on	
the	use	of	senior	civil	servants	as	scapegoats	for	faults	committed	by	politicians.	
The	increasing	requirements	of	open	accountability	to	parliament	or	its	committees	by	
senior	public	servants	have	also	contributed	to	the	greater	public	profile	of	mandarins.	
Scholars	have	noted	this	shift	in	the	United	Kingdom	(Van	Dorpe	and	Horton	2011),	Canada	
(Bourgalt	2011),	and	Australia	(Dixon	et	al	1996;	Weller	2001,	154).	Interestingly,	Kernaghan	
was	already	discerning	a	shift	away	from	anonymity	in	the	late	1970s	because	of	the	need	
for	officials	to	‘explain	government	policies	in	public	forums’,	and	the	increasing	
inquisitiveness	of	journalists	(1979,	391).	
	 But	the	impacts	of	such	changes	are	not	necessarily	uniform	across	the	Westminster	
world.		In	some	jurisdictions,	the	culture	of	transparency	and	accountability	has	arguably	
actually	helped	to	protect	public	servants	from	being	seen	as	partisan	in	the	advice	they	
give.		For	example,	the	freedom	of	information	environment	in	New	Zealand	allows	
journalists	to	compare	government	decisions	with	the	advice	that	was	given	by	public	
servants.		In	other	words,	it	becomes	a	matter	of	open	public	record	that	a	public	servant	
has	disagreed	with	a	minister,	lessening	the	level	of	blame	that	can	attach	to	public	servants	
for	whatever	outcomes	may	result	(Boston	and	Halligan	2012,	218-219).		
	
Agency-Centred	Historical	Institutionalism	and	the	Promiscuous	Partisan	
Aucoin	makes	clear	that	his	charge	of	‘promiscuous	partisanship’	relies	as	much	on	informal	
conventions	and	behaviours	as	it	does	on	formal	guidelines	of	behaviour.		Aucoin	asserts	
that:	
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The	culture	of	promiscuous	partisanship	is	nowhere	articulated	as	the	norm	for	the	
public	service.		Everywhere,	impartiality	remains	the	official	doctrine.		Indeed,	if	
anything,	it	is	asserted	more	often	now	as	codes	of	conduct	and	values	are	
proclaimed.		Yet,	breaches	are	commonplace.	(Aucoin	2012,	189)			
Aucoin’s	assertion	sets	up	a	classic	analytical	dichotomy	between	the	influence	of	structure	
versus	the	influence	of	agency	on	the	behaviour	of	actors	–	in	this	case	the	behaviour	of	
public	servants	and	the	ministers	who	direct	them.		Aucoin	essentially	asserts	that	despite	
the	institutionalised	traditions	of	the	Westminster	system,	and	the	structural	support	of	
guidelines	that	stress	the	importance	of	impartiality,	public	service	actors	are	interpreting	
and	constructing	their	behaviours	based	on	their	perception	of	what	ministers	want.	
The	challenge	for	that	approach	in	this	context	is	that	individual	behaviours	are	
being	used	to	suggest	systemic	failure,	without	a	commensurate	body	of	evidence	to	show	
that	promiscuous	partisanship	has	indeed	permeated	further	than	the	individual	actions	of	a	
handful	of	senior	public	service	leaders.		Both	Boston	(2012)	and	Nethercote	(2012)	in	their	
critiques	of	Aucoin’s	thesis	suggest	that	the	evidence	of	a	systemic	change	is	slim.		Aucoin’s	
individual	examples	of	behaviour	by	senior	public	servants	are	important	but	not	conclusive	
in	themselves.		It	is	equally	possible	to	cite	counter	examples,	such	as	the	decision	by	the	
Australian	Secretaries	of	Finance	and	Treasury	to	issue	a	joint	media	release	during	the	2013	
election	campaign	contradicting	the	public	statements	of	ministers	about	policy	advice	they	
had	been	given	by	the	public	service	(Parkinson	and	Tune	2013).	
In	other	words,	I	argue	that	the	structural	and	institutional	importance	of	guidelines	
on	values,	ethics	and	conduct	for	public	servants	cannot	be	so	lightly	dismissed.		Their	
capacity	to	shape	boundaries	for	behaviour	and	to	protect	public	servants	from	political	
pressure	is	significant.		Bell’s	(2011)	work	developing	a	theory	of	agency-centred	historical	
institutionalism	is	instructive	here.		Bell	argues	that	the	nature	of	institutions	can	and	does	
effect	the	options	that	individual	actors	perceive	as	being	available	to	them	–	even	when	
exercising	an	important	degree	of	individual	agency.		The	nature	of	those	structural	
boundaries	can	range	from	formal	instruments	or	guidelines	that	set	out	expected	
behaviours	through	to	received	wisdoms	on	accepted	norms.		As	the	work	of	Rhodes	(2011)	
illustrates,	institutional	shape	can	in	part	be	derived	from	received	traditions	passed	down	
as	‘stories’	about	how	a	department	functions.		Such	stories	can	create	a	kind	of	interpretive	
historical	institutionalism	as	contemporary	actors	draw	on	the	stories	of	those	who	have	
gone	before.			
The	combined	conventions,	traditions	and	stories	of	how	bureaucrats	should	behave	
in	a	Westminster	environment	form	part	of	the	institutional	structure	that	determines	
whether	individual	actors	perceive	themselves	as	promiscuous	partisans	or	not.		Equally,	the	
structure	provided	by	guidelines	on	appropriate	behaviour	sets	important	parameters	for	
the	exercise	of	agency.		To	the	extent	that	a	public	servant	can	say	‘no’	to	a	ministerial	
request	that	they	believe	to	be	inappropriate,	it	is	the	ability	to	point	to	structural	guidelines	
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that	gives	their	case	some	formal	authority.		It	is	much	easier	to	say	‘no’	to	a	minister	if	you	
can	point	to	a	specific	guideline	that	the	proposed	instruction	is	breaching,	rather	than	
simply	saying	it	doesn’t	sit	well	with	one’s	own	interpretation	of	how	things	should	be	done.		
Utilising	the	theoretical	framework	provided	by	agency-centred	historical	institutionalism,	
the	following	sections	provide	a	comparative	account	of	the	formal	rule	structures	that	
shape	the	ability	of	public	servants	to	exercise	a	degree	of	personal	agency	as	public	actors.			
	
Australia	
In	Australia,	the	responsibilities	of	public	servants	are	encapsulated	in	the	Australian	Public	
Service	(APS)	Code	of	Conduct	and	the	APS	Values.		These	are	supported	by	interpretations	
made	in	documents	such	as	the	Australian	Public	Service	Commissioner’s	Directions,	and	
through	guidance	published	on	the	Australian	Public	Service	Commission	(APSC)	website.		
The	Commissioner’s	Directions	for	2013	provide	clarity	in	Chapter	1.6	on	what	it	means	for	
public	servants	to	act	impartially,	as	required	under	the	APS	Values.	
(a)	serving	the	Government	of	the	day,	providing	the	same	standard	of	high	quality	
policy	advice	and	implementation,	and	the	same	high	quality	professional	support,	
irrespective	of	which	political	party	is	in	power	and	of	personal	political	beliefs;		
(APS	Commissioner	2013,	Ch.	1.6)	
	
This	impartial	service	must	however	be	provided	in	a	way	that	shows	public	servants	are	
“(d)	understanding	the	needs	of	the	Government…”	and	“(f)	providing	advice	that	takes	
account	of	the	context	in	which	policy	needs	to	be	implemented,	the	broader	policy	
directions	set	by	Government	and,	where	appropriate,	implications	for	the	longer	term”	
(APS	Commissioner	2013,	Ch.	1.6).	
Advice	and	behaviour	certainly	needs	to	be	impartial	and	non-partisan,	but	must	also	
reflect	the	priorities	of	the	government	of	the	day.		So	how	far	should	public	servants	
interpret	this	as	a	responsibility	to	enthusiastically	and	publicly	support	government	policy?		
The	APSC	provides	guidance	directly	on	the	topic	in	its	advice	on	“Involvement	of	public	
servants	in	public	information	and	awareness	initiatives”	(APSC	n.d.)		The	guidelines	make	
clear	that	public	servants	cannot	simply	hold	themselves	aloof	from	public	engagement	on	
the	grounds	that	it	is	an	inherently	political	activity.	
Australian	public	servants	have	a	legitimate	role	in	helping	to	explain	to	the	
Australian	community	how	Government	policy	decisions	and	initiatives	will	be	
implemented,	how	they	will	operate	and	how	they	will	affect	rights,	entitlements	
and	responsibilities.	(APSC	n.d.)	
	
But	in	undertaking	these	duties,	public	servants	are	walking	a	precarious	and	
inherently	contested	tightrope	in	explaining	government	policies	that	are	the	subject	of	
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fierce	and	sustained	political	criticism	from	the	opposition	and	public	interest	groups.		The	
rules	do	not	attempt	to	hide	the	complexity	of	this	task:	
The	APS	Values	mean	that	public	servants	should	not	become	involved	in	any	official	
capacity	with	promoting	or	commenting	on	a	Government	policy.	Similarly,	public	
servants	should	not	in	any	official	capacity	criticise	or	comment	on	the	policies	of	the	
Opposition	or	other	political	organisations.	Agency	resources	are	not	to	be	used	to	
support	political	campaigns.	
But	these	Values	also	mean	that	public	servants	have	a	duty	to	effectively,	
professionally	and	proactively	explain	and	implement	Government	policies	and	
programmes	and	to	ensure	that	the	community	fully	understands	how	these	policies	
and	programmes	will	operate	and	what	their	rights,	entitlements	and	obligations	
might	be.	(APSC	n.d.)	
The	guidelines	recognise	that:	“The	issue	of	what	might	or	what	might	not	appear	to	be	
political	may	vary	in	different	circumstances	and	agencies	and	individual	public	servants	will	
need	to	be	aware	of	and	manage	certain	risks”	(APSC	n.d.).		The	rules	then	go	on	to	
differentiate	between	the	“explanation	of	Government	policies	and	programmes”	–	which	is	
seen	as	part	of	the	“core	responsibility”	of	the	public	service	–	and	“public	information”	
promotion,	which	needs	“to	be	considered	very	carefully”	(APSC	n.d.).	
In	drawing	the	distinction	between	explanation	and	promotion,	the	rules	embrace	a	
very	wide	ambit	for	the	former	in	terms	of	the	ability	of	public	servants	to	adopt	a	public	
face.		Explanation	involves	far	more	than	just	the	normal	public	interaction	at	service	
counters	by	street	level	bureaucrats.		It	can	include	“speaking	at	public	forums	and	engaging	
in	public	discussions”	and	“developing	and	appearing	in	written	information	material	
targeting	the	public	such	as	Government	leaflets,	booklets	and	newsletters”	(APSC	n.d.).		
Appearance	in	the	media	can	be	actively	embraced	where	appropriate	by	“contributing	
articles	to	non-government	newspapers,	magazines	and	journals”	and	“responding	to	media	
queries	and	participating	in	media	interviews	and	discussions,	including	on	radio	and	
television”	(APSC	n.d.).		In	other	words,	public	servants	are	empowered	to	explain	
government	policy	in	pretty	much	any	forum	and	media	that	they	deem	appropriate.		But,	
as	the	rules	again	make	clear,	it	would	be	naïve	to	think	that	the	distinction	between	
explanation	and	advocacy	is	clear	cut	and	uncontroversial.	
Effective	explanation	of	Government	policies	and	programmes	may	involve	both	
straight	information	and	as	well	as	comment	designed	to	explain	and	highlight	
elements	of	this	information.	A	key	issue	is	the	extent	to	which	comment	might	be	
perceived	as	advocacy,	and	this	will	require	judgement	in	individual	cases.	Again,	the	
rule	of	thumb	is	that	it	is	the	Government’s	responsibility	to	explain	why	a	policy	or	
programme	decision	has	been	taken	and	the	public	servant’s	responsibility	to	explain	
what	the	decision	means	and	how	it	will	operate.	(APSC	n.d.)	
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But	this	should	not	stop	public	servants	from	correcting	“misconceptions”	about	how	
government	policies	are	to	work	–	another	activity	that	is	extraordinarily	difficult	to	
distinguish	from	political	arguments	that	might	be	taking	place	about	that	policy.	
An	important	element	in	implementing	and	explaining	Government	policies	and	
programmes	may	be	the	need	to	counter	community	and	stakeholder	
misconceptions.	Care	may	need	to	be	taken	to	ensure	that	attempts	to	correct	these	
errors	are	not	perceived	as	criticisms	of	the	Opposition	or	of	other	stakeholders.	In	
these	circumstances,	a	statement	of	the	facts	in	neutral	language	is	less	likely	to	be	
perceived	as	‘political’	than	a	direct	refutation	of	Opposition	or	other	political	
stakeholder	claims.	(APSC	n.d.)	
	
New	Zealand	
The	New	Zealand	State	Services	Commission	released	a	Political	Neutrality	Guidance	in	2010	
to	help	explain	–	in	plain	English	terms	–	how	public	servants	could	go	about	maintaining	
political	impartiality.		“This	means,	essentially,	that	State	servants	must	keep	their	jobs	out	
of	their	politics	and	their	politics	out	of	their	jobs”	(State	Services	Commission	2010b,	1).		
This	is	especially	so	for	those	staff	who	work	most	closely	with	the	ministers	of	the	day.	
The	rights	of	political	expression	and	association	must	be	balanced	against	the	well	
established	convention	that	senior	State	servants	who	have	regular	direct	contact	
with	Ministers	ought	not	to	publicly	express	any	view	either	for	or	against	the	
policies	of	the	Government	of	the	day.	This	may	mean	for	staff	actively	engaged	in	
providing	advice	to	Ministers	on	a	particular	issue,	that	it	is	not	appropriate	to	
participate	in	public	protest	and	political	activity	centred	on	that	issue.	(State	
Services	Commission	2010b,	2)	
	
This	specific	guidance	on	political	neutrality	is	supported	by	the	wider	Standards	of	
Integrity	and	Conduct	for	State	servants.		The	State	Services	Commission	provides	guidance	
to	underpin	these	standards	in	its	Understanding	the	Code	of	Conduct	–	Guidance	for	State	
Servants.		The	relevant	guidance	for	public	speaking	in	an	official	capacity	is	provided	under	
the	standard:	“We	must	respect	the	authority	of	the	government	of	the	day”	(State	Services	
Commission	2010a,	15).		The	guidance	is	noticeably	restrictive	in	its	interpretation	of	the	
role	of	the	State	Service	in	providing	comment	on	government	policy	on	behalf	of	an	
organisation.	
Ministers	set	and	comment	on	government	policy.	The	role	of	most	of	us	in	the	State	
Services	is	to	explain	and	give	effect	to	that	policy.	A	few	State	servants	hold	
statutory	roles	that	from	time	to	time	may	require	them	to	comment	publicly	about	
government	policy.	Some	of	us	work	in	organisations	with	independent	decision-
making	or	advocacy	responsibilities	and	may	be	authorised	to	comment	publicly	on	
policy	issues.	It	is	only	if	we	have	one	of	these	exceptional	roles	that	we	may	
	 10	
comment	about	government	policy	on	behalf	of	our	organisation.	(State	Services	
Commission	2010a,	15)						
This	suggests	that	the	ability	to	comment	is	limited	to	the	kind	of	statutory	or	crown	
authority	that	operates	at	arms	length	from	government,	as	opposed	to	the	line	
departments	that	are	directly	responsible	to	their	minister.		The	guidance	attempts	to	
engage	with	the	crucial	question	of	the	perception	of	behaviour	as	well	as	the	actual	
behaviour.		“We	must	bear	in	mind	the	sensitivity	that	both	current	and	future	Ministers	
may	have	about	our	involvement	in	high-profile	activities	that	could	be	viewed	as	party	
political”	(State	Services	Commission	2010a,	15).		The	guidance	warns	against	the	general	
unacceptability	of	revealing	information	not	yet	known	to	the	public,	purporting	to	“express	
or	imply	an	organisational	view”,	or	“criticise	in	such	strong	or	persistent	terms	that	our	
ability	to	give	full	effect	to	the	executive	government	responsibilities	of	our	organisation	in	
an	impartial	way	is	called	into	question”	(State	Services	Commission	2010a,	16).	
	
United	Kingdom	
At	the	home	of	Westminster,	so	long	governed	by	the	unwritten	conventions	of	how	civil	
servants	should	behave,	there	has	been	a	move	in	the	last	two	decades	towards	clear	
written	rules	on	what	is	expected	of	civil	servants.		The	Civil	Service	Code,	similar	to	the	
codes	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand,	provides	the	broad	parameters	for	civil	service	
behaviour.		The	Cabinet	Office	has	put	out	documents	including	the	full	Directory	of	Civil	
Service	Guidance	and	the	more	specific	Propriety	Guidance,	which	was	released	through	the	
Government	Communications	Network	in	2013	to	deal	specifically	with	civil	servants	and	
government	communications.	
The	Civil	Service	values	and	accompanying	code,	legislated	through	the	2010	
Constitutional	Reform	and	Governance	Act,	provide	directions	to	all	civil	servants	on	the	
meaning	of	‘political	impartiality’.		The	Code	stipulates	that	Civil	Servants	must:	
• serve	the	Government,	whatever	its	political	persuasion,	to	the	best	of	your	
ability	in	a	way	which	maintains	political	impartiality	and	is	in	line	with	the	
requirements	of	this	Code,	no	matter	what	your	own	political	beliefs	are;	
• act	in	a	way	which	deserves	and	retains	the	confidence	of	Ministers,	while	at	the	
same	time	ensuring	that	you	will	be	able	to	establish	the	same	relationship	with	
those	whom	you	may	be	required	to	serve	in	some	future	Government.	(Civil	
Service	Code	2010,	section	14)					
What	this	necessarily	general	formulation	does	not	provide	is	guidance	on	where	the	line	is	
between	unacceptable	partiality	and	acceptable	‘responsiveness’.		All	that	is	prohibited	is	
enacting	one’s	own	political	beliefs.	
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The	2013	Propriety	Guidance	is	far	more	specific	in	the	level	of	support	or	even	
enthusiasm	that	civil	servants	are	expected	to	demonstrate	for	government	policy.		The	
guidance	is	targeted	especially	at	those	civil	servants	who	have	regular	interactions	with	the	
media	as	part	of	their	normal	duties	–	i.e.	press	officers	–	but	its	scope	is	not	limited	to	
those	officers.		The	rules	would	seem	to	apply	to	any	civil	servant	engaged	in	a	
communication	act	on	behalf	of	the	government.		To	begin	with,	the	guidance	openly	
recognises	the	inability	to	entirely	divorce	impartial	communications	from	questions	of	the	
political	benefit	that	governments	derive	from	it.	
Publicly	funded	government	communications	cannot	be	used	primarily	or	solely	to	
meet	party	political	objectives.	However,	it	is	recognised	that	the	governing	party	
may	derive	incidental	benefit	from	activities	carried	out	by	the	Government.	
(Cabinet	Office	n.d.,	5)	
	
The	guidance	then	sets	out	what	the	Government	has	the	“right”	to	expect	of	its	civil	
service	press	officers	in	particular	and	refers	specifically	to	the	“ministerial	line”.			
It	is	the	duty	of	press	officers	to	present	the	policies	of	their	department	to	the	
public	through	the	media,	and	to	try	to	ensure	that	they	are	understood.	The	press	
officer	must	always	reflect	the	ministerial	line	clearly,	even	where	policies	are	
opposed	by	opposition	parties.		As	part	of	the	Government’s	duty	to	govern,	it	needs	
to	explain	its	policies	and	decisions	to	the	electorate.		The	Government	has	the	right	
to	expect	the	department	to	further	its	policies	and	objectives,	regardless	of	how	
politically	controversial	they	might	be.	(Cabinet	Office	n.d.,	6)	
The	incredibly	fine	judgement	calls	that	this	asks	of	civil	servants	are	then	
highlighted	by	stating	that	press	officers	“have	a	duty…to	remain	objective	and	impartial,	
especially	when	dealing	with	politically	controversial	issues”	(Cabinet	Office	n.d.,	6).		The	
inherent	tension	between	following	a	“ministerial	line”	and	remaining	“objective	and	
impartial”	is	left	to	civil	servants	to	manage.		As	Mulgan’s	research	demonstrates,	expecting	
civil	servants	to	propound	a	public	view	in	contentious	policy	debates	threatens	public	
perceptions	of	their	impartiality	(Mulgan	2008,	349).	
This	tension	reaches	a	further	pitch	of	difficulty	in	the	2013	Propriety	Guidance	in	the	
list	of	“press	office	dos	and	don’ts”	that	follows.		Press	officers	are	told	that	they	should:	
• Present,	describe	and	justify	the	thinking	behind	the	policies	of	the	minister.	
• Be	ready	to	promote	the	policies	of	the	department	and	the	Government	as	a	
whole.	
• Make	as	positive	a	case	as	the	facts	warrant.	(Cabinet	Office	n.d.,	6)	
The	inclusion	of	the	word	“promotion”	rather	than	the	more	traditional	
“explanation”	is	a	significant	raising	of	the	bar	in	terms	of	the	level	of	enthusiastic	support	
being	asked	of	civil	service	press	officers.		Even	more	significant	perhaps	is	the	expectation	
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that	civil	servants	will	seek	to	“justify	the	thinking	behind	the	policies	of	the	minister.”		This	
goes	far	beyond	explanation	and	even	promotion	because	it	asks	civil	servants	to	defend	the	
thinking	of	ministers	–	an	activity	that	is	self-evidently	not	an	impartial	one.		The	third	point	
underlines	this	requirement	by	effectively	institutionalising	a	responsibility	to	spin	by	
making	“as	positive	a	case	as	the	facts	warrant.”		It’s	not	just	about	objectively	presenting	
facts,	but	doing	so	in	the	most	“positive”	light	that	the	facts	will	allow.		It	would	be	hard	to	
think	of	a	clearer	definition	of	spin	in	modern	politics.			
The	current	UK	guidelines	must	necessarily	be	read	against	the	backdrop	of	changes	
instituted	during	the	first	term	of	the	Blair	Government.		Under	the	direction	of	Blair’s	
communications	head	–	Alistair	Campbell	–	departmental	media	officers	were	expected	to	
be	much	more	forthright	in	their	support	of	government	policy.		The	simple	provision	of	
information	to	media	outlets	was	not	sufficient.		A	greater	degree	of	proactive	advocacy	
was	expected	(see	Wilson	and	Barker	2003,	369;	Hennessy	2000,	488-89).	
A	recent	report	from	the	Institute	for	Public	Policy	Research	(IPPR)	comparing	the	
accountability	and	responsiveness	of	senior	civil	servants	in	different	jurisdictions	makes	
clear	that	each	country	has	its	own	unique	set	of	arrangements	(Institute	for	Public	Policy	
Research	2012).		In	particular,	the	United	Kingdom	has	been	more	reluctant	than	other	
countries	to	provide	ministers	with	large	numbers	of	politically	appointed	advisers	who	can	
more	clearly	prosecute	the	minister’s	political	agenda.		The	IPPR	report	argues	that	one	of	
the	reasons	Australian,	Canadian	and	New	Zealand	governments	have	opted	for	large	
numbers	of	advisers	in	private	offices	is	to	insulate	the	rest	of	the	public	service	from	
pressure	to	become	involved	in	political	matters.			
In	that	light,	the	2013	Propriety	Guidance	could	be	viewed	as	an	attempt	to	meet	the	
political	needs	of	government	by	co-opting	civil	servants	to	undertake	tasks	that	might	be	
done	by	political	appointees	in	other	jurisdictions.		The	weakness	of	that	proposition	is	the	
fact	that	the	area	where	British	governments	have	been	the	most	prepared	to	appoint	
special	advisers	is	in	the	media	and	communications	area.		In	other	words,	if	political	
advisers	are	already	being	hired	to	spin	for	the	government,	the	institutional	justification	for	
co-opting	civil	servants	to	undertake	the	task	is	decreased.	
	
Canada	
In	Canada,	the	2011	Values	and	Ethics	Code	for	the	Public	Sector	provides	the	overarching	
guidance	on	public	servant	behaviour.		Like	all	three	of	the	other	jurisdictions	already	
discussed,	the	Code	maintains	the	centrality	of	impartiality	to	the	working	of	a	successful	
public	service.		Under	the	value	of	‘Respect	for	Democracy’,	the	Code	states:	
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Public	servants	recognize	that	elected	officials	are	accountable	to	Parliament,	and	
ultimately	to	the	Canadian	people,	and	that	a	non-partisan	public	sector	is	essential	
to	our	democratic	system.	(Government	of	Canada	2011,	3)	
The	Public	Service	Commission	of	Canada	(PSCC)	provides	more	specific	guidelines	
on	“Safeguarding	non-partisanship	in	the	Public	Service”	(PSCC	2013),	but	these	relate	
specifically	to	safeguarding	merit-based	selection	in	hiring	and	to	regulating	the	political	
activities	of	public	servants	who	might	wish	to	run	as	a	candidate	in	an	election	or	engage	in	
other	political	behaviour.		It	provides	little	clarity	for	how	public	servants	should	act	publicly	
when	acting	in	their	official	capacity.		In	July	2008,	the	PSCC	released	a	publication	entitled	
Public	Service	Impartiality:	Taking	Stock,	which	provides	a	very	clear	discussion	of	the	
various	dimensions	of	impartiality	as	it	relates	to	the	work	of	public	servants.	
The	document	re-iterates	the	traditional	distinction	between	explanation	of	policy	
and	the	defence	or	advocacy	of	it.	
Although	public	servants	are	to	be	sensitive	to	partisan	considerations,	they	are	not	
actively	to	support	or	debate	policy	decisions.	While	they	may	be	required	to	explain	
policy	rationale,	public	servants	are	not	to	argue	in	favour	of	or	against	a	particular	
policy.	(Furi	2008,	para	5.13,	p.18)	
The	inherent	tension	between	loyalty	to	the	government	and	the	duty	of	impartiality	is	
clearly	acknowledged.		“The	paradox	is	that	public	servants	must	be	non-partisan,	while	
remaining	loyal	to	a	legal	entity	whose	powers	are	exercised	by	a	political	body”	(Furi	2008,	
para	5.18,	p.	19).	
Public	Service	Impartiality:	Taking	Stock	goes	on	to	highlight	that	it	is	the	public	
nature	of	what	public	servants	do	or	say	that	ultimately	determines	the	degree	to	which	
perceptions	of	politicisation	will	emerge.	
Regardless	of	how	the	visibility	of	public	servants	has	increased,	the	more	visible	
public	servants	are,	the	more	vulnerable	they	become	to	partisan	political	attacks.	If	
public	servants	are	attacked	publicly	by	one	party	and	praised	by	another,	this	could	
undermine	public	service	impartiality.	This	issue	is	further	complicated	when	one	
considers	the	statutory	authorities	and	responsibilities	given	to	deputy	heads.	(Furi	
2008,	para	6.4,	p.	21).	
	
The	Treasury	Board	of	Canada	Secretariat	displays	the	Communications	Policy	of	the	
Government	of	Canada	on	its	website.		This	largely	high-level	document	sets	out	the	
communications	requirements	expected	of	organisations	operating	as	part	of	the	Canadian	
Public	Service.		Bureaucratic	leaders	are	directed	to	uphold	the	“...integrity	and	impartiality	
of	the	Public	Service	of	Canada”	(Treasury	Board	of	Canada	Secretariat	2012,	point	9).	
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Canadians	value	an	independent,	professional	Public	Service	that	treats	individuals	
with	respect,	fairness	and	integrity.	The	value	and	reputation	of	public	institutions	
must	be	honoured.	Public	service	managers	and	employees	are	expected	to	provide	
information	services	in	a	non-partisan	fashion	consistent	with	the	principles	of	
parliamentary	democracy	and	ministerial	responsibility.	(Treasury	Board	of	Canada	
Secretariat	2012,	point	9)		
The	rules	mandate	that	relations	with	the	media	must	be	cultivated,	but	only	to	raise	
“awareness”	and	“understanding”	of	government	policy,	rather	than	extending	to	justifying	
those	policies	as	the	UK	guidelines	suggest.		“Institutions	must	cultivate	proactive	relations	
with	the	media	to	promote	public	awareness	and	understanding	of	government	policies,	
programs,	services	and	initiatives”	(Treasury	Board	of	Canada	Secretariat	2012,	policy	
requirement	19).		But	the	document	equally	makes	clear	that	it	is	ministers	and	not	public	
servants	who	carry	the	responsibility	of	explaining	government	policies.	
Ministers	present	and	explain	government	policies,	priorities	and	decisions	to	the	
public.	Institutions,	leaving	political	matters	to	the	exclusive	domain	of	ministers	and	
their	offices,	focus	their	communication	activities	on	issues	and	matters	pertaining	
to	the	policies,	programs,	services	and	initiatives	they	administer.	(Treasury	Board	of	
Canada	Secretariat	2012,	policy	requirement	20)	
The	policy	suggests	that	the	role	of	public	servants	is	to	“inform”	citizens	about	the	
contents	of	government	policy	–	stopping	well	short	of	either	explanation	or	justification.	
[I]nforming	the	public	about	policies,	programs,	services	and	initiatives	in	an	
accountable,	non-partisan	fashion	consistent	with	the	principles	of	Canadian	
parliamentary	democracy	and	ministerial	responsibility.	(Treasury	Board	of	Canada	
Secretariat	2012,	Appendix	B)	
There	has	been	recent	debate	in	Canada	about	the	effect	of	the	‘Message	Event	
Proposal’	(MEP)	system	instituted	by	the	Harper	Government	(see	Thomas,	2013).		The	MEP	
process	centralised	government-wide	communications	control	in	the	Prime	Minister’s	Office	
(PMO),	including	control	over	the	events	and	speeches	of	senior	public	servants.		At	one	
level,	the	practice	certainly	supports	Aucoin’s	overarching	NPG	thesis	by	suggesting	an	
intense	desire	on	the	part	of	ministers	–	and	especially	the	prime	minister	–	to	exert	political	
control	over	every	aspect	of	public	service	activity.		Whether	or	not	this	leads	to	perceptions	
of	public	service	partisanship	relies	significantly	on	how	individual	public	servants	respond	
to	the	attempts	at	control	and	how	willing	they	remain	to	exercise	their	own	judgement	in	
choosing	what	to	say	at	public	events.	
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Significance	and	Discussion			
Each	jurisdiction	under	examination	here	has	produced	guidelines	covering	various	aspects	
of	the	values	and	behaviours	expected	of	public	servants.		This	includes	specific	guidelines	
on	the	level	of	public	support	for	governments	that	is	expected	and	appropriate.		In	all	four	
cases,	these	guidelines	certainly	encourage	the	clear	explanation	–	sometimes	in	the	face	of	
criticism	–	of	the	policies	of	the	government	of	the	day.		At	the	same	time,	in	all	four	cases,	
the	rules	specifically	state	the	ongoing	importance	of	impartiality	and	non-partisanship	as	
foundation	stones	of	how	a	public	service	operates.			
In	the	New	Zealand	case,	the	rules	stop	short	of	asking	public	servants	to	inject	some	
form	of	enthusiasm	for	government	policy	that	goes	beyond	the	explanation	of	how	policy	
works.		This	contrasts	with	both	Australia	and	Canada	where	a	degree	of	‘proactivity’	is	
encouraged	in	the	way	public	servants	engage	with	the	media.		Under	the	Canadian	
Treasury	Board	Secretariat	rules,	“Institutions	must	cultivate	proactive	relations	with	the	
media	to	promote	public	awareness	and	understanding	of	government	policies,	programs,	
services	and	initiatives”	(Treasury	Board	of	Canada	Secretariat	2012,	policy	requirement	19).		
Similarly,	the	Australian	rules	stipulate	a	duty	for	public	servants	to	“effectively,	
professionally	and	proactively	explain	and	implement	Government	policies”	(APSC	n.d.).		
The	imperative	of	proactivity	is	significant	because	it	suggests	a	level	of	enthusiasm	is	
required	in	order	to	actively	seek	out	opportunities	to	explain	policies	rather	than	waiting	to	
be	asked.	
The	New	Zealand	and	Canadian	rules	are	quite	explicit	that	it	is	the	job	of	ministers	–	
not	public	servants	–	to	promote	and	comment	upon	the	political	reasons	for	policy	
decisions.		But	in	the	Canadian	case,	this	wider	point	juxtaposes	somewhat	awkwardly	
against	the	requirement	that	public	service	institutions	“promote	public	awareness	and	
understanding	of	government	policies,	programs,	services	and	initiatives”	(Treasury	Board	
of	Canada	Secretariat	2012,	policy	requirement	19).		The	lines	between	“explanation”	of	
policy,	“promotion”	of	policy,	and	the	open	defence	of	policy	are	impossible	to	set	with	a	
clarity	that	can	defy	any	blurring.		This	has	two	potentially	significant	consequences.		Firstly,	
it	allows	significant	room	for	the	exercise	of	individual	discretion	by	public	servants	in	
deciding	how	far	they	can	reasonably	go	in	their	public	explanations	of	government	policy.		
So	–	in	terms	of	an	institutions	versus	agency	analysis	–	individual	agency	remains	
important,	albeit	within	the	bounds	established	by	the	institutional	structures	through	
which	the	agents	are	operating.		Secondly,	it	creates	the	inevitability	that	public	
appearances	by	public	servants	will	lead	to	perceptions	that	they	have	become	politicised,	
even	when	they	are	in	reality	taking	every	precaution	not	to	be.			
If	public	servants	are	encouraged	to	appear	in	the	media	and	elsewhere	to	explain	
government	policy	settings,	they	can	become	tightly	and	closely	associated	with	the	policy	
itself	in	the	public	mind.		Paradoxically,	whilst	acting	with	integrity	and	impartiality	in	
carefully	keeping	within	Westminster	conventions,	public	servants	can	nevertheless	find	
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themselves	in	the	middle	of	political	firestorms.		The	position	of	former	Australian	Treasury	
Secretary	Ken	Henry	in	the	Mining	Tax	debate	in	Australia	in	2010	is	one	recent	example.		At	
the	request	of	the	Rudd	government,	Henry	undertook	a	sweeping	review	of	the	Australian	
taxation	system	in	2008-10.		Amongst	his	recommendations	was	that	the	government	adopt	
a	new	way	of	taxing	profits	from	natural	resources	to	maximise	the	returns	from	the	mining	
boom.		The	Rudd	government	in	2010	committed	to	a	Resource	Super	Profits	Tax	without	
fully	adopting	Henry’s	proposal.		What	followed	was	a	protracted	partisan	political	battle	as	
the	Opposition	opposed	the	new	tax,	and	Henry	faced	criticism	suggesting	that	he	had	
politicised	his	position	by	being	too	supportive	of	the	government’s	position	(AAP	2010).			
In	a	different	way,	but	with	similar	consequences,	the	current	UK	Cabinet	Secretary	
Sir	Jeremy	Heywood’s	role	in	the	“Plebgate”	affair	generated	intense	media	scrutiny	in	
2012-13.		The	“Plebgate”	affair	revolved	around	the	remarks	of	the	then	government	Chief	
Whip,	Andrew	Mitchell,	when	he	was	alleged	to	have	called	police	officers	“Plebs”	for	not	
letting	him	ride	his	bike	out	of	the	gates	at	Downing	Street.		At	the	request	of	the	Prime	
Minister,	Heywood	conducted	an	initial	inquiry	into	aspects	of	the	matter.		He	was	
subsequently	heavily	criticised	by	the	House	of	Commons’	Public	Administration	Committee	
over	his	handling	of	the	inquiry,	and	for	having	agreed	to	carry	out	such	an	inquiry	in	the	
first	place	when	he	was	not	the	right	person	to	do	so.		Those	criticisms	were	widely	
publicised	in	the	media	(see	for	example:	Sparrow	2013;	Ross	2013).		In	both	the	Henry	and	
Heywood	cases,	it	could	be	argued	that	public	servants	were	legitimately	responding	to	the	
instructions	of	ministers,	only	to	find	themselves	repeatedly	criticised	by	Opposition	MPs	
and	the	media	because	of	the	public	nature	of	their	role.	
Perhaps	in	order	to	avoid	such	situations,	the	New	Zealand	rules	seek	to	minimise	
public	comment	all	together.		They	stress	that	“[i]t	is	only	if	we	have	one	of	these	
exceptional	roles	that	we	may	comment	about	government	policy	on	behalf	of	our	
organisation”	(State	Services	Commission	2010a,	15).		The	New	Zealand	rules	specifically	
warn	against	individuals	purporting	to	“express	or	imply	an	organisational	view”	(State	
Services	Commission	2010a,	16).		At	the	highest	levels	of	the	public	service,	this	can	create	
difficulties	for	senior	leaders	engaged	in	placing	broad	policy	options	before	the	government	
and	the	public.		It	is	certainly	not	unusual	in	public	speeches	by	Treasury	Secretary’s	to	hear	
them	refer	to	“Treasury’s	view”	on	a	particular	policy	conundrum	–	carefully	expressed	so	as	
not	to	contradict	any	existing	government	policy.	
The	United	Kingdom	approach	is	notably	different.		Especially	in	its	language	
regarding	the	duties	of	press	officers,	it	entrenches	an	expectation	of	full-throated	support	
for	the	government	of	the	day,	regardless	of	how	contentious	a	policy	might	be.		The	
guidelines	specifically	ask	civil	service	press	officers	to	follow	the	“ministerial	line”,	and	
present	information	as	positively	as	possible	whilst	“justifying”	the	thinking	of	their	
ministers	to	the	wider	public	through	the	media.		Aucoin’s	argument	was	essentially	that	–	
despite	the	claims	within	codes	of	conduct	and	guidelines	that	impartiality	was	a	central	
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value	–	public	servants	were	being	pressured	to	act	in	politically	partisan	ways.		In	one	
sense,	the	current	UK	approach	takes	Aucoin’s	argument	one	step	further	by	actually	
formalising	a	degree	of	promiscuous	partisanship	within	the	guidelines	themselves.			
As	all	the	relevant	documents	indicate,	discretion	and	judgement	remain	at	the	core	
of	how	public	servants	behave	when	confronted	with	blurred	lines	between	impartiality	and	
serving	the	government	that	they	are	responsible	to.		Each	of	the	jurisdictions	examined	
acknowledges	that	the	individual	judgement	of	public	servants	on	what	is	the	right	thing	to	
do	remains	central.		The	extent	to	which	‘promiscuous	partisanship’	is	displayed	publicly	by	
public	servants	can	therefore	best	be	understood	within	a	theoretical	framework	of	agency-
centred	historical	institutionalism.	Clear	rules	have	emerged	over	decades	of	Westminster	
practice	and	been	codified	in	modern	documents	on	values	and	ethics,	but	in	each	case	
these	rules	remain	to	be	interpreted	by	the	individual	actors	who	must	abide	by	them.		
Those	actors	can	and	do	of	course	also	draw	on	collegial	discussion	with	peers,	and	their	
own	past	experience,	in	arriving	at	their	professional	judgement	on	any	given	matter.		
Institutional	structures	such	as	guidelines	and	codes	of	conduct	do	not	exclude	other	factors	
from	influencing	an	agent’s	decision-making	–	but	they	provide	the	formal	parameters	in	
which	it	occurs.		The	importance	of	the	guidelines	remains	because	they	can	either	protect	
the	traditional	values	of	impartiality	and	non-partisanship,	or	they	can	begin	to	normalise	
and	even	institutionalise	a	fundamental	change	in	Westminster	traditions	in	favour	of	more	
partisan	behaviour.	
It	is	argued	here	that	–	taken	collectively	–	the	guidelines	in	Australia,	New	Zealand	
and	Canada	do	suggest	that	governments	expect	the	public	support	of	the	public	service	in	
promoting	government	policy,	but	that	this	is	not	fundamentally	at	odds	with	traditional	
Westminster	expectations	of	the	public	service.		Public	servants	have	always	been	expected	
to	serve	the	government	of	the	day	by	implementing	its	policies,	regardless	of	their	own	
political	views	and	the	views	of	the	previous	government.		Does	the	suggestion	that	they	
should	do	so	with	greater	levels	of	enthusiasm	automatically	mean	they	cross	a	line	into	the	
kind	of	partisanship	that	will	prevent	them	being	able	to	serve	the	next	government?		
Arguably	it	stretches	traditional	Westminster	bounds,	but	does	so	in	an	evolutionary	way	
that	doesn’t	render	current	practice	as	unrecognisable	based	on	earlier	traditions.		Further	
studies	will	provide	important	empirical	data	on	the	extent	to	which	other	emerging	
pressures	-	such	as	the	increasing	use	by	government	of	PR	professionals,	and	the	rising	
importance	of	social	media	–	are	pushing	public	servants	into	new	spheres	of	activity	not	
covered	by	existing	Westminster	conventions.	
In	contrast,	the	United	Kingdom	case	seems	to	provide	a	qualitative	shift	towards	
exactly	the	kind	of	public	promiscuous	partisanship	that	Aucoin	was	warning	against.		The	
United	Kingdom	Proprietary	Guidance	clearly	enshrines	a	level	of	support	for	“ministerial	
lines”	of	communication	by	civil	service	press	officers	that	is	difficult	to	distinguish	from	
open	advocacy.		The	language	specifically	asks	civil	servants	to	express	“…the	ministerial	line	
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clearly,	even	where	policies	are	opposed	by	opposition	parties”	(Cabinet	Office	n.d.,	6).		So	it	
is	not	simply	providing	explanation	of	how	policies	are	implemented	but	backing	the	
“ministerial	line”	for	why	they	are	being	implemented.		This	begins	to	beg	the	question	of	
just	how	civil	servants	backing	a	ministerial	line	remain	distinguishable	from	politically	
appointed	advisers	who	are	hired	specifically	to	promote	the	government’s	political	line.	
With	public	service	leaders	increasingly	becoming	part	of	the	public	face	of	
government,	the	propensity	for	perceptions	of	politicisation	to	grow	becomes	almost	
unavoidable.		If	public	servants	are	asked	to	publicly	represent	the	government	at	events,	
toe	the	“ministerial	line”	whilst	doing	so,	provide	as	“positive”	a	view	of	things	as	they	can	
and	“justify”	the	thinking	of	ministers	in	the	face	of	criticism,	it	would	be	incredible	if	
perceptions	of	their	politicisation	did	not	follow.		It	places	public	servants	in	the	invidious	
position	that	they	can	be	professionally	and	impartially	doing	their	job	and	yet	become	
publicly	tainted	as	partisan	supporters	of	the	government	of	the	day.		That	is	why	the	
wording	of	codes,	values	and	guidelines	remains	so	important.		They	can	provide	a	formal	
restraint	that	can	slow	down	any	informal	push	by	political	leaders	for	their	public	service	to	
be	more	partisan	in	their	support.		 	
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